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Abstract
We introduce a game of trusted computation in which a sensor equipped with limited com-
puting power leverages a central node to evaluate a specified function over a large dataset,
collected over time. We assume that the central computer can be under attack and we propose
a strategy where the sensor retains a limited amount of the data to counteract the effect of
attack. We formulate the problem as a two player game in which the sensor (defender) chooses
an optimal fusion strategy using both the non-trusted output from the central computer and
locally stored trusted data. The attacker seeks to compromise the computation by influencing
the fused value through malicious manipulation of the data stored on the central node. We first
characterize all Nash equilibria of this game, which turn out to be dependent on parameters
known to both players. Next we adopt an Iterated Best Response (IBR) scheme in which, at
each iteration, the central computer reveals its output to the sensor, who then computes its best
response based on a linear combination of its private local estimate and the untrusted third-
party output. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of the IBR
along with numerical results which show that the convergence conditions are relatively tight.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) [1] is the next generation internet where many embedded devices
(sensors, actuators, controllers, etc.) are interconnected and can exchange data. Although such
devices are becoming increasingly more advanced and capable, the amount of data they can process
is still a small fraction of what they can collect. As a consequence, IoT devices may need to leverage
intermediate but more capable devices that can store and compute over larger data streams.
We study the problem where a sensor (short for IoT device) exchanges data with a larger and
more powerful computer to carry out a specific computation on the data the sensor has collects
over a certain period of time. Ideally, the sensor would be able to send/stream the data to the
computer, which would then compute the function and send back the result. However, we assume
here that the data stored in the central computer can be manipulated maliciously by an attacker.
In this case, the sensor has three options: 1) to retain a small amount of the data and compute the
function of interest on such trustworthy data knowing that the computation will not be as accurate
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or, 2) take the risk that the attack is only mildly compromising the data on the central computer
so that the result of the computation is close to the true value; or, 3) try to exchange partial results
iteratively with the central computer and fuse locally trusted computation on small sample with
tampered computation on the full dataset.
This paper formalizes the third scenario, which has the other two as limiting cases. In particular,
we model this problem of trusted computation as a game between the sensor/central computer and
the attacker. We design and analyze a simple protocol in which each player plays its best response
and we study its convergence properties. Additionally, this paper makes a “worst case” assumption,
namely that the attacker knows exactly the fusion strategy adopted by the sensor.
The approach we consider in this paper is related to an emerging field called adversarial machine
learning, wherein two parties, a learner and an attacker, are involved, see [10, 3, 14]. The learner
uses data to train, for example, a classifier or a regressor, and the attacker is modifying the data so
that the learner ends up training the algorithm incorrectly. In this context, the problem is posed as
a Bayesian game [14], where the learner minimizes the effect of the attack on the learning algorithm,
whereas the attacker maximizes the deviation of such learning algorithm from the correct result
and towards a strategically chosen outcome, under the assumption that only a subset of the data
can be modified. In [14], for example, the e-mail spam problem is considered, where the learner
is set to train a classifier to discriminate between spam and non-spam, while the attacker tries to
maximize the chances that a spam is classified as non-spam.
The approach considered in this paper also relates to the procedure of fictitious play (FP). In
this procedure, each player tries to learn the probability distribution from which the opponent is
drawing its actions [5, 13]. A recent body of work in the control literature analyzes convergence
of fictitious play for several scenarios [15, 16, 11]. In particular, [15] presents unified energy-based
convergence proofs that work for several special classes of games under FP. In [16], convergence
to Nash equilibria is analyzed under the assumption that each player can access the derivatives of
the update mechanisms, leading to dynamic FP. A variant of FP, known as Joint Strategy FP, is
proposed and the convergence analyzed for several classes of games, especially in high-dimensional
spaces, see [11]. More recently, Gaussian cheap talk games, such as [8], have been considered. In
this context, a sender (adversary) sends corrupted information to a receiver (sensor) under the
assumption that the adversary has full knowledge of the receiver’s private information.
1.1 Main Contributions
The contributions of this paper are four-fold. First, we formulate a new problem on trusted com-
putation within a game-theoretic framework and adopt an Iterated Best Response (IBR) [12, 9]
algorithm to compute final strategies for the sensor and the attacker. More specifically, we consider
a protocol such that at each iteration, the attacker reveals its output to the sensor that then com-
putes its best response as a linear combination of its private local estimate and of the untrusted
output. The attacker can then, based on the announced policy of the sensor, decide its best re-
sponse. There is a clear mismatch in the information pattern between attacker and sensor and, in
particular, the fact that the attacker cannot access the realization of the private local estimate of
the sensor distinguishes this work from the information pattern considered in cheap talk games [8].
Second, we characterize conditions on the existence of equilibria of the game. These conditions
and the equilibria themselves turn out to be functions of all of the problem parameters, viz., the
private information belonging to both players. Therefore, to obtain results from a single player’s
perspective, a third contribution of this paper is to define two notions of convergence for the IBR
algorithm, depending upon whether the algorithm converges for some initial value picked by the
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attacker (weak convergence), or for every initial value (strong convergence). We derive necessary
conditions for weak convergence and sufficient conditions for strong convergence. If the algorithm
converges, then it also tells the sensor how to optimally fuse its private estimate with the output.
We identify regimes in which some sufficient conditions are also necessary. Numerical simulations
indicate that the conditions are relatively tight.
Fourth and finally, the analysis in this paper allows for a certain level of mismatch in the
distributions used by the players in computing their respective cost functions. This generalizes
the analysis presented in the preliminary conference version [4], which assumed that the attacker
knows precisely the mean of the distribution used by the sensor to compute its private estimate.
Additionally, in the special scenario considered in [4], the analysis in this paper recovers the results
from [4], and in one of the cases, also improves the result.
Given that the proposed framework requires an iterative process between sensor and the cen-
tral computer, the algorithm presented in this paper could be suitable for computation algorithms
that are iterative in nature so that partial results can be exchanged between sensor and the cen-
tral computer. Examples are eigenvalue/eigenvector computation, matrix factorization, iterative
optimization methods, etc. The connection of this work to control theory lies in the fact that
convergence analysis of the IBR essentially leads to a closed loop dynamical system. This aspect
is similar in flavor to the set-ups analyzed in [15, 16, 11]. Using geometric relationships to bound
the evolution, we determine necessary and sufficient conditions on the parameters involved which
will lead to stability from any/some initial conditions.
1.2 Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows. The problem formulation and the proposed approach is described
in Section 2. Conditions for the existence of equilibria together with an insightful geometric in-
terpretation are presented in Section 3. Convergence results for the IBR algorithm are derived in
Section 4 along with supporting numerical results. A special case of equal means of the random
variables used by the two players is discussed in Section 5. Finally, conclusions and directions for
future research are discussed in Section 6.
2 Problem Formulation
The problem scenario is depicted in Figure 1. This work assumes that the data and the computation
to be carried out are such that it is possible for the sensor to compute an estimate of the true
output locally using some random subset of the data, and that the statistics (up to the mean with
a finite second moment) about how the actual value is distributed given a value of estimate is
known to the sensor. For example, suppose that the data d ∈ RN×M , consisting of N data points
each represented by an M -dimensional feature vector, is uploaded through a trusted sensor to the
third-party computer. During the upload process, the sensor could retain a randomly sparsified
sample dˆ ∈ RN×M of the original data d. The data, once stored on the central computer, can be
compromised by the attacker leading to a different value d¯ ∈ RN×M . The sensor seeks to compute
the true value of the function y = g(d) ∈ Rk of the data d where g : RN×M → Rk is an algorithm
of interest. For example, g(d) ∈ R could be the maximum singular value of a matrix with dˆ being
a sparsified sample of d. The sensor has only an approximate knowledge, yˆ = g(dˆ) ∈ Rk, of y,
obtained from the sparsified data dˆ. The third-party computer computes the value y¯ = g(d¯) ∈ Rk
based on the corrupted data d¯. This paper does not address the problem of how to construct a
sparsified sample dˆ, but rather makes an implicit assumption that for a given number of non-zero
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Figure 1: Trusted computation over an adversarial third-party computer. The sensor has a large
dataset of which it draws a sample dˆ and uploads the entire dataset onto the central computer.
The computer returns some value y¯ as the output of the computation, while the sensor computes
a value yˆ based on the sample dˆ. The goal is to fuse, using a function φ(.), the two quantities yˆ
and y¯ in an optimal manner.
elements in dˆ and a corresponding sparsification procedure, the distribution of y given yˆ can be
characterized a priori. The actual construction of a specific sampling procedure for a computation
such as the maximum eigenvalue would be a topic of future investigation and we direct an interested
reader to [2] and [7] for related existing results.
The sensor needs to design a fusion function φ : Rk × Rk → Rk that provides yfused so that the
effect of the attack is minimized, i.e., the sensor seeks to minimize the squared error between yfused
and y in an expected sense. On the other hand, the attacker seeks to drive the fused value to a
different value yA instead of the true y, and therefore, seeks to minimize the squared error between
yfused and yA in an expected sense. The attacker returns a value y¯ ∈ Rk, which will be chosen in
order to minimize the mean squared error between yfused and yA.
Given a value of yˆ, one can view the true value y as a random variable, and we assume that the
conditional distribution of y given yˆ (y|yˆ) is known to the sensor. From the sensor’s perspective,
this work only requires it to know the mean of y given yˆ and the fact that y given yˆ has bounded
variance. This paper proposes a new protocol between the sensor and the computer that will
enable the sensor to compute an optimal fusion strategy yfused = φ(yˆ, y¯) ∈ Rk, in the space of
convex combinations of the approximate value yˆ and the computer’s output y¯, to minimize the
mean square error, i.e.,
JD := Ey[‖yfused − y‖2 | yˆ] , (1)
where the norm ‖ · ‖ is the 2-norm. The goal of the attacker is to pick a y¯ to minimize the mean
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square error
JA := Eyˆ[‖yfused − yA‖2] , (2)
where yA is a value that the attacker chooses to corrupt the sensor. We will assume that yA is a
fixed and non-random value known only to the attacker. In other words, the goal of the attacker
is to choose a value y¯ to be given to the sensor as the output of the computation so that when the
sensor fuses this value with its private estimate yˆ, the fused value yfused becomes close to a certain
value yA which is selected by the attacker. The value yA is the value that the attacker wants the
sensor to believe is the true output. The mismatch in the information structure available to both
players is reflected in their respective cost functions in that the random variable relative to which
the expectation is computed is the one whose realization is not known to that player.
In the space of allowed strategies, we choose φ(.) = φα(.) to be a convex combination of yˆ and y¯,
namely
yfused := φα(yˆ, y¯) = αyˆ + (1− α)y¯ . (3)
In other words, the sensor needs to compute an α ∈ [0, 1], thus deciding the weight to attach to its
own value yˆ and the attacker’s output y¯. Therefore, both cost functions, JD and JA are functions
of the action α ∈ [0, 1] of the sensor and the action y¯ ∈ Rk of the attacker. To be specific, let µ
denote the expected value of y given yˆ using a density function chosen by the sensor, modeling
the sensor’s knowledge about the data, and let ζ denote the expected value of yˆ using the density
function chosen by the attacker, modeling the knowledge the attacker has about the data. In the
space of linear strategies (3), the cost functions (1) simplifies to:
JD(α, y¯) =
∫
Rk
‖αyˆ + (1− α)y¯ − w‖2fy|yˆ(w)dw
= ‖α(yˆ − y¯) + y¯‖2 +
∫
Rk
‖w‖2fy|yˆ(w)dw
− 2(α(yˆ − y¯) + y¯)Tµ (4)
where µ :=
∫
Rk wfy|yˆ(w)dw, and fx|y(·) denotes the probability density function of a random
variable x given y. The cost function (2) simplifies to:
JA(α, y¯) =
∫
Rk
‖αw + (1− α)y¯ − yA‖2fyˆ(w)dw
= α2
∫
Rk
‖w‖2fyˆ(w)dw + ‖(1− α)y¯ − yA‖2
+ 2α((1− α)y¯ − yA)T ζ, (5)
where the quantity ζ :=
∫
Rk wfyˆ(w)dw. This is a non zero-sum game for which we will consider
the following notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium) An admissible pair (α∗, y¯∗) is a Nash equilibrium if
JD(α
∗, y¯∗) ≤ JD(α, y¯∗) , ∀α ∈ [0, 1], and
JA(α
∗, y¯∗) ≤ JA(α∗, y¯) , ∀y¯ ∈ Rk .
Further, if α∗ ∈ (0, 1), then the resulting Nash equilibrium pair is said to be mixed.
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In other words, a pair of strategies is in equilibrium if no other strategy can give a strictly
better cost against the opponent’s strategy, from each player’s perspective. Further, when the best
response of the sensor is mixed, it means that the sensor selects a non-trivial weighted combination
of yˆ and y¯. However, it will be clear from the next section that an explicit one-shot computation of
the equilibrium strategies requires the players to have full knowledge of all the problem parameters,
i.e., yˆ, y, yA, and the expected values µ and ζ of y given yˆ and y, respectively. Clearly, from one
player’s point of view, this information is not available. Indeed, yA is a private information that
the attacker has and is not shared with the sensor and the yˆ is private information of the sensor
which is not shared with the attacker. Therefore, we will consider the following iterative scheme in
which each player will announce its best response to a strategy announced by the opponent, with
the attacker playing first. This protocol is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Iterated Best Response
Assumes: Attacker plays first, i.e., select a value for y¯0.
i = 0
αi = 0
# Exit when α reaches steady-state or becomes 1
while αi sequence has not converged do
i = i+ 1
# Client updates its action based on y¯i−1
αi = argminα∈[0,1] JD(α, y¯i−1).
# Attacker updates its action based on αi
y¯i = argminy¯ JA(αi, y¯).
# Exit and trust the sensor output only
if αi == 1 then
return αi
end if
end while
return αi and y¯i
To apply Algorithm 1, we will first need to compute the best responses of each player against
an action of the opponent. Setting ∂JD/∂α = 0 in (4), we obtain the unconstrained minimizer
(α(yˆ − y¯) + y¯)T (yˆ − y¯)− (yˆ − y¯)Tµ = 0⇔ α∗unc(y¯) =
(µ− y¯)T (yˆ − y¯)
‖y¯ − yˆ‖2 .
Due to the constraint α∗ ∈ [0, 1], the best response for the sensor is:
α∗(y¯) =

0 , if (y¯ − µ)T (yˆ − y¯) ≥ 0 ,
1 , if (yˆ − µ)T (y¯ − yˆ) ≥ 0 ,
(y¯ − µ)T (y¯ − yˆ)
‖y¯ − yˆ‖2 , otherwise.
(6)
A similar calculation for the attacker yields,
y¯∗(α) =

yA − αζ
1− α , if α 6= 1 ,
any value , if α = 1 .
(7)
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Figure 2: The locations for y¯ (in the subspace containing yA) that lead to different values of α
∗,
given the values of yA, yˆ and µ. The green locations lead to α = 0, the red locations lead to α = 1
and the blue locations lead to a mixed α.
Observe that y¯∗ is a linear combination of yA and ζ. Since we have a total of four parameters
yˆ, ζ, yA and µ, it is convenient considering the plane containing the three points yˆ, ζ, yA and let
µˆ be the orthogonal projection of µ on to this plane. Therefore, we can write µ := µˆ + µ⊥. Since
µ⊥T (y¯ − yˆ) = 0, α∗(y¯) can be rewritten as
α∗(y¯) =

0 , if (y¯ − µˆ)T (yˆ − y¯) ≥ 0 ,
1 , if (yˆ − µˆ)T (y¯ − yˆ) ≥ 0 ,
(y¯ − µˆ)T (y¯ − yˆ)
‖y¯ − yˆ‖2 , otherwise.
(8)
Interestingly, we can give a geometric interpretation to (8) and (7), as shown in Figure 2. In
particular, the figure illustrates the locations of y¯ that lead to different values of α∗, given the
values of yA, yˆ and µˆ. In the plane defined by yA, yˆ and ζ, a given subspace containing yA can be
divided into at most three distinct regions corresponding to the three regimes in (8). The green
regime corresponds to the set of points y¯ for which α∗(y¯) = 0 and when it exists, it lies between
two blue regimes corresponding to the set of points y¯ for which α∗(y¯) ∈ (0, 1). The red regime
corresponds to the set of points y¯ for which α∗(y¯) = 1. Note that the boundary points between the
green and blue regimes satisfy the property that the lines joining them to µˆ and yˆ are orthogonal
to each other, as highlighted in Figure 2.
The termination condition within the if loop of Algorithm 1 is due to the fact that when α = 1,
it implies that the output of the central computer is not to be trusted, and thereafter, the computer
is not providing any further useful information than the sensor’s private value of yˆ. In order to
discard trivial initial conditions for which Algorithm 1 would exit at the first iteration, we will
restrict our discussion to non-trivial initial values of y¯0 defined next.
Definition 2 (Non-trivial initial condition) An initial condition y¯0 is said to be non-trivial if
Algorithm 1 does not exit at the first iteration.
We will consider the following two notions of convergence for Algorithm 1.
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Definition 3 (Weak Convergence) Algorithm 1 is said to possess weak convergence property
if, for some non-trivial initial condition y¯0 and for some values of the means µ and ζ, Algorithm 1
outputs α∗ ∈ [0, 1).
Definition 4 (Strong Convergence) Algorithm 1 is said to possess strong convergence property
if, for every non-trivial choice of y¯0, and for every value of the means µ and ζ, Algorithm 1 outputs
α∗ ∈ [0, 1).
In the sequel, we will see that the weak convergence concept will be useful from the sensor’s
perspective, whereas strong convergence will be useful from the attacker’s perspective. The main
contributions in the rest of this paper are to present conditions on the problem parameters, viz. yˆ
,y, yA, µ and ζ, under which: 1) equilibrium strategies exist for Algorithm 1 and 2) Algorithm 1
demonstrates weak or strong convergence properties. Whenever Algorithm 1 converges, then the
steady-state strategies correspond to a Nash equilibrium (cf. Definition 1).
3 Equilibrium Strategies
In this section, we will derive conditions on the parameters yˆ, yA, µ and ζ under which equilibria
exist for the system of equations (6) and (7).
Let δ := ζ − µ, zA := yA − ζ, and zˆ := yˆ − ζ. The following is the main result on the equilibria
of the above system.
Theorem 3.1 (Equilibrium) For the system (6) and (7), we have the following:
i. The pair of strategies (α∗, y¯∗) = (0, yA) is an equilibrium if and only if
(yA − µ)T (yˆ − µ) ≥ ‖yA − µ‖2 .
ii. An equilibrium in mixed strategies exists if and only if
(zˆT (zˆ + 2zA − δ))2 ≥ 4zTA(zˆ + zA − δ)zˆT zˆ .
This result provides conditions on the game parameters under which one of the two types of
equilibria considered in this paper would exist. The first type is the one when α∗ = 0, i.e., the sensor
completely trusts the output from the central computer. The condition in (i) essentially describes
the set of values for the attacker’s intent yA for which it will be beneficial for the sensor to use the
output y¯ from the central computer than its own value yˆ. The second type is the one which will
require the sensor to fuse its private value yˆ with the value y¯ in a non-trivial way (α∗ ∈ (0, 1)).
Proof:
i. The claim follows from the best response of the players for the case when α∗ = 0. In this
case, y¯∗ = yA. Conversely, if y¯∗ = yA, then α∗ = 0 if and only if
(yA − µ)T (yˆ − yA) ≥ 0⇔ (yA − µ)T (yˆ − µ− (yA − µ)) ≥ 0 ,
which establishes the first claim.
ii. Since we are searching for mixed policies α∗, we substitute the expression for α∗(y¯) into the
fixed point equation for y¯ to obtain
y¯ =
yA‖yˆ − y¯‖2
(yˆ − µ)T (yˆ − y¯) +
(µ− y¯)T (yˆ − y¯)
(µ− yˆ)T (yˆ − y¯)ζ
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Subtracting ζ from both sides, we have
y¯ − ζ = yA‖yˆ − y¯‖
2
(yˆ − µ)T (yˆ − y¯) +
((µ− y¯)T (yˆ − y¯)
(µ− yˆ)T (yˆ − y¯) − 1
)
ζ
y¯ − ζ = yA‖yˆ − y¯‖
2
(yˆ − µ)T (yˆ − y¯) −
‖yˆ − y¯‖2
(µ− yˆ)T (yˆ − y¯)ζ.
By denoting z¯ := y¯ − ζ, we obtain
z¯ =
‖zˆ − z¯‖2
(zˆ − δ)T (zˆ − z¯)zA (9)
⇒ z¯∗ = rzA ,
where r is a scalar that must satisfy
r =
‖zˆ − rzA‖2
(zˆ − rzA)T (zˆ − δ) .
On simplifying, we obtain the following quadratic equation in r:
zTA(zˆ + zA − δ)r2 − zˆT (zˆ + 2zA − δ)r + zˆT zˆ = 0 .
The condition now follows from the existence of real roots to the above quadratic equation.

Clearly, the computation of equilibria requires complete information of the problem parameters.
Therefore, in the next sub-section, we will characterize conditions on the parameters under which
Algorithm 1 will converge.
4 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we will derive conditions under which Algorithm 1 possesses weak and strong
convergence.
From the point of view of the sensor, the goal is to characterize conditions on the attack
parameter yA for which Algorithm 1 will converge in the weak and in the strong sense. However,
there is an additional uncertainty on where the attacker’s mean ζ will lie. We will commence the
convergence analysis for a given value of ζ and then extend it to the case when there is a bound
on the amount of mismatch, such as one in the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1 (Mismatch parameter) The mismatch ζ − µ satisfies
‖ζ − µ‖ ≤ 
1 + 
‖yˆ − µ‖ ,
for some given value of  ∈ [0, 1].
This assumption is reasonable to expect because the deviation ‖yˆ − µ‖ will be relatively large
when only a small subset of the data being sampled. The convergence analysis will require two
intermediate results using geometry which we present in the next sub-section.
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Figure 3: Illustrating Lemma 4.2. The attacker’s mean, ζ is assumed to lie inside the sphere
centered around µ and the shaded region illustrates the plane containing the points yˆ, yA and ζ.
The point µˆ is the orthogonal projection of µ on to this plane.
4.1 Preliminary Geometric Results
Given any yA, we will first show that Assumption 4.1 leads to the following upper bound on ‖ζ−µˆ‖,
where µˆ is the orthogonal projection of µ on to the plane containing ζ, yA and yˆ.
Lemma 4.2 (Mismatch bound) For given values of ζ, yA and yˆ, under Assumption 4.1, we have
‖ζ − µˆ‖ ≤ ‖yˆ − µˆ‖ .
Proof: Consider a realization of the parameters ζ, yˆ, yA and µ as shown in Figure 3. Since µˆ is the
orthogonal projection of µ on to the plane containing ζ, yˆ and yA,
‖ζ − µˆ‖ ≤ ‖ζ − µ‖ . (10)
Applying the triangle inequality, we obtain
‖yˆ − µˆ‖ ≥ ‖yˆ − µ‖ − ‖µˆ− µ‖
≥ ‖yˆ − µ‖ − ‖ζ − µ‖
≥ (1 + 1

)‖ζ − µ‖ − ‖ζ − µ‖
=
1

‖ζ − µ‖ ≥ 1

‖ζ − µˆ‖ ,
where the second inequality follows since µˆ is the orthogonal projection of µ on to the plane
containing ζ, yA and yˆ, the third inequality follows from Assumption 4.1 and the final inequality
follows from (10). 
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Figure 4: Illustrating Lemma 4.3. The point y¯ lies in the closure of the half plane defined by the
line joining yˆ and yA with the side not containing µˆ.
We will also require another geometric result which will aid the proof of the necessary condition.
We introduce the following notation: given two vectors x1, x2 ∈ Rk, the vector Proj(x1, x2) ∈ Rk
denotes the orthogonal projection of x1 onto x2.
Lemma 4.3 Suppose that a point y¯ satisfies the following:
i. α∗(y¯) ∈ (0, 1), and
ii. y¯ lies in the closure of the half plane defined by the line joining yˆ and yA with the side not
containing µˆ.
Then,
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − yˆ)‖ ≥ ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, y¯ − yˆ)‖ .
Proof: We refer the reader to Figure 4 for an illustration. Let the smaller angle between yA − yˆ
and y¯ − yˆ be α and the angle between µˆ− yˆ and yA − yˆ be β. Given the second assumption in the
lemma, we have:
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − yˆ)‖ = ‖yˆ − µˆ‖ cos(α+ β)
and
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, y¯ − yˆ)‖ = ‖yˆ − µˆ‖ cos(β) .
Since α∗(y¯) ∈ (0, 1), from (8) we conclude that α+β ≤ pi/2, from which the claim is readily derived.

4.2 Weak Convergence
We now begin our analysis of a necessary condition assuming that yA and ζ are known, which
therefore implies that µˆ is known.
Theorem 4.4 (Weak Convergence given ζ, yA) For given values of ζ, yˆ and yA, the following
hold:
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i. For Algorithm 1 to converge to (α∗ = 0, y¯∗ = yA), yA must satisfy:
(yA − µˆ)T (yˆ − yA) ≥ 0 .
ii. Under Assumption 4.1, for Algorithm 1 to weakly converge, yA must satisfy
(yˆ − µˆ)T (yA − yˆ) < 0 .
iii. Let Ψµˆ be defined as the closure of the half-plane defined by the line joining yˆ and yA and which
contains the point µˆ. For Algorithm 1 to yield a converging sequence of mixed α∗ ∈ (0, 1), yA
must satisfy either one of the following:
(a) ‖yA − ζ‖ ≤ ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − yA)‖ , ζ ∈ Ψµˆ ,
(b) ‖yA − ζ‖ ≤ ‖yˆ − µˆ‖ , ζ /∈ Ψµˆ .
Proof:
i. Algorithm 1 results into a steady-state value (α∗ = 0, y¯∗ = yA) only if (cf. (6) and (7)),
(yA − µ)T (yˆ − yA) ≥ 0⇔ (yA − µˆ)T (yˆ − yA) ≥ 0 ,
since µˆ is the orthogonal projection of µ on to the plane containing ζ, yA and yˆ. This proves
the first case.
ii. Suppose that Algorithm 1 converges to an α∗ ∈ [0, 1) from some arbitrary, non-trivial initial
condition y¯0. If y¯0 is in the green region (α0 = 0), then after one iteration of Algorithm 1,
we obtain y¯1 = yA. If yA is also in the green region (i.e., corresponding to α1 = 0), then the
algorithm converges to an equilibrium with α∗ = 0 and case i) applies. On the other hand,
if yA is in the blue region (α ∈ (0, 1)), then it follows that y¯1 = yA, and thus y¯1 lies in the
blue region (α ∈ (0, 1)). Therefore, we can assume that without any loss of generality, y¯0 is
in the blue region. From (8), it needs to hold that
(yˆ − µˆ)T (yˆ − y¯0) > 0 .
Now, substituting (7) into (8) and on following the same steps that led to (9), we have that
after one iteration of Algorithm 1, y¯1 is such that the vector y¯0−ζ is a positive scalar multiple
of the vector yA − ζ. More precisely, we have
y¯1 − ζ = ‖yˆ − y¯0‖
2
(yˆ − µˆ)T (yˆ − y¯0)(yA − ζ) .
Now, observe that the ratio
‖yˆ − y¯0‖2
(yˆ − µˆ)T (yˆ − y¯0) =
‖yˆ − y¯0‖
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯0)‖ > 1 , (11)
which implies that for any non-trivial y¯0, y¯1−ζ is a positive scalar multiple greater than unity
of yA − ζ.
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Let us assume, for the sake of arriving at a contradiction, that 0 ≤ (yˆ− µˆ)T (yA − yˆ), namely
that the condition of case ii) does not hold. Therefore, we can write
0 ≤ (yˆ − µˆ)T (yA − yˆ)⇒0 ≤ (yˆ − µˆ)T (yA − ζ + ζ − µˆ+ µˆ− yˆ)
⇒‖yˆ − µˆ‖2 − ‖yˆ − µˆ‖‖ζ − µˆ‖ cosψ ≤ (yˆ − µˆ)T (yA − ζ) ,
where ψ is the smaller angle between the vectors yˆ− µˆ and ζ− µˆ. Since Assumption 4.1 holds,
Lemma 4.2 holds. Therefore, the left hand side of the above inequality is non-negative, and
thus,
0 ≤ (yˆ − µˆ)T (yA − ζ)⇒ 0 ≤ (yˆ − µˆ)T (y¯1 − ζ), (12)
since y¯1 − ζ is a positive scalar multiple of yA − ζ.
Now, from (11), we can write
0 ≤ (yˆ − µˆ)T (yA − yˆ) = (yˆ − µˆ)T
(
1
r
(y¯1 − ζ) + (ζ − yˆ)
)
≤ (yˆ − µˆ)T (y¯1 − yˆ) ,
where the second inequality follows from (12) and from the fact that r = ‖yˆ − y¯0‖2/((yˆ −
µˆ)T (yˆ − y¯0)) ≥ 1. This however implies, from (8), that y¯1 is in the red region (α1 = 1). But
this is not possible as we already showed that y¯1 is in the blue region (α = (0, 1)). This proves
the second case.
iii. From the previous case, without loss of generality, we can assume that (y¯0 − ζ) is a positive
scalar multiple of yA− ζ, and that y¯0 is in the blue region (i.e., corresponding to α ∈ (0, 1)).
Suppose that for every i ≥ 0, y¯i is in the blue region, i.e., every αi ∈ (0, 1). Then consider
the recursion,
‖y¯i − ζ‖ = ‖yˆ − y¯i−1‖
2‖yA − ζ‖
|(yˆ − µˆ)T (yˆ − y¯i−1)| ⇔ ‖y¯i − ζ‖ =
‖yˆ − y¯i−1‖‖yA − ζ‖
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯i−1)‖ , (13)
Note that (13) may be viewed as a discrete-time dynamical system in y¯. Replacing y¯0 by y¯i−1
in (11), we have that for every i ≥ 1, and for any y¯0, such that y¯0 − ζ is a positive scalar
multiple of yA − ζ,
‖y¯i−1 − ζ‖ > ‖yA − ζ‖ . (14)
We need now to distinguish two cases.
iii.a If ζ ∈ Ψµˆ, then (14) implies that for every i ≥ 1, the point y¯i−1 ∈ Ψcµˆ, namely the complement
of Ψµˆ. We refer to Figure 5 for a geometric interpretation of the proof. Additionally, we have
that α∗(y¯i−1) ∈ (0, 1). Thus, applying Lemma 4.3, we conclude that for every i ≥ 1,
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯i−1)‖ ≤ ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − yA)‖ . (15)
Further, from applying the triangle inequality to the three points y¯i−1, yˆ and ζ, we have
‖yˆ − y¯i−1‖ ≥ ‖y¯i−1 − ζ‖ − ‖yˆ − ζ‖ . (16)
Combining this together with (15) and (13) yields
‖y¯i − ζ‖ ≥ ‖yA − ζ‖(‖y¯i−1 − ζ‖ − ‖yˆ − ζ‖)‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − yA)‖ ,
which is a linear system in the quantity ‖y¯i − ζ‖. This implies that Algorithm 1 will output
a converging sequence of mixed α∗’s only if
‖yA − ζ‖ ≤ ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − yA)‖ .
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Figure 5: Illustrating one possible scenario in the proof of Theorem 4.4. In this scenario, the points
ζ and µˆ lie on the same side of the line joining yA and yˆ, i.e., the requirement in the third case
in the statement of Theorem 4.4 is satisfied, which leads to inequality (15) to hold. In gray, we
indicate Ψµˆ, the closure of the half-plane defined by the line joining yˆ and yA and which contains
the point µˆ.
iii.b If ζ ∈ Ψcµˆ, then we can apply the following upper bound
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯i)‖ ≤ ‖yˆ − µˆ‖ ,
which follows from the fact that the length of the projection of a vector x onto any another
vector can never exceed the length of x itself. Following the same steps as in the previous
case, we conclude that the sequence ‖y¯i − ζ‖ will converge only if
‖yA − ζ‖ ≤ ‖yˆ − µˆ‖ .
This proves the iii) case. 
We numerically verify this result by studying the region of divergence for Algorithm 1 in two
dimensions. In the planar case, the value of the mean µ = µˆ = (0, 0), and the sensor’s value yˆ =
(0.8, 0). The attacker’s mean, ζ = (0.3,−0.2). For every value of yA on a grid in the neighborhood of
µˆ, we ran Algorithm 1 for a set of different initial values y¯0. The results are summarized in Figure 6.
If the algorithm converged1 to an α∗ ∈ [0, 1) for some choice of y¯0, then the corresponding point
yA is shown as a (green) dot. Otherwise, it is shown as a (red) cross. The analytically derived
necessary conditions from Theorem 4.4 is shown as a black dashed contour.
1The convergence condition in Algorithm 1 was approximated by running the while loop for a sufficiently large
number of iterations. In our simulations, we used 100 steps.
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Figure 6: Numerically generated plot to study the region of divergence for Algorithm 1 in two
dimensions. The value of the mean µˆ = (0, 0) (shown as a (magenta) star), the attacker’s mean
ζ = (0.3,−0.2) (shown as a (black) diamond) and the sensor’s value yˆ = (0.8, 0), shown as a (
black) square. For every value of yA = [yA(1), yA(2)] on a grid in the neighborhood of µ, we run
Algorithm 1 for a set of different initial values y¯0. If the algorithm converges to an α
∗ ∈ [0, 1)
for some choice of y¯0, then the corresponding point yA is shown as a (green) dot. Otherwise, it is
shown as a (red) cross. The analytically derived necessary conditions from Theorem 4.4 is shown
as a black dashed contour.
We now revisit the fact that the parameter ζ is not known to the sensor. Suppose that ζ ∈ C,
where C is a set known to the sensor and which satisfies Assumption 4.1. Define the set Nζ as
the set of all points x ∈ Rk which satisfy the necessary conditions from Theorem 4.4. Then, the
following result holds.
Corollary 4.5 (Necessary Condition) Suppose that C is a set of all ζ ∈ Rk that satisfies As-
sumption 4.1. Then, a necessary condition for weak convergence of Algorithm 1 is that
yA ∈
⋃
ζ∈C
Nζ .
Proof: Suppose that Algorithm 1 weakly converges, i.e., for some ζ¯ ∈ C and some non-trivial
initial condition y¯0, α
∗ ∈ [0, 1). Then, yA must satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4.4. Therefore,
yA ∈ Nζ¯ , and hence, yA ∈
⋃
ζ∈C Nζ . 
In Figure 7 we plot the analytic condition from Corollary 4.5 for different sets C in R2. Since
this example is planar, µˆ = µ. In particular, let the value of the mean µ = (0, 0), the sensor’s value
yˆ = (1, 0), and the set C be different circles of increasing radii around µ. Figure 7 shows how the
set
⋃
ζ∈C Nζ evolves with increasing radius, δ, of C. As is expected, the set computed for a higher
values of the radius contains the set computed for a lower one. In other words, for a higher level of
uncertainty about the attacker’s mean ζ, the necessary condition becomes more conservative.
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Figure 7: Plot of how the analytic necessary condition from Corollary 4.5 evolves for increasing
radii of the set C which contains ζ. This plot has been numerically generated by sampling 100
points uniformly randomly out of circles C of radii δ equal to zero (solid (red) line), 0.2 (dotted
(green) line), and 0.4 (dashed (blue) line). In this figure, we show yˆ as a (black) square and µ as a
(black) dot.
4.3 Strong Convergence
The next result establishes a sufficient condition for strong convergence.
Theorem 4.6 (Strong Convergence given ζ, yA) For given values of ζ, yˆ and yA, Algorithm 1
possesses strong convergence if
i. (yA − ζ)T (yˆ − µˆ) ≤ 0 , and (17)
ii. ‖yA − ζ‖ ≤ min(‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − ζ)‖, ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − yˆ)‖) . (18)
Additionally, condition (17) is also necessary for strong convergence.
Proof: Following the same steps that lead to (14) in the proof of Theorem 4.4, we can assume
without any loss of generality that y¯0−ζ is a positive scalar multiple (greater than unity) of yA−ζ.
Recall (13):
‖y¯i − ζ‖ = ‖yˆ − y¯i−1‖‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯i−1)‖‖yA − ζ‖ . (19)
Observe that in the regime given by (17), the angle between the vectors yA− ζ and yˆ− µˆ lies in the
interval [pi/2, pi]. In this regime, for every i ≥ 1, one out of the following two possibilities occurs.
i. ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯i−1)‖ ≥ ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − ζ)‖ , (20)
which holds whenever ζ is contained in Ψµˆ
2. This can be seen in Figure 8. Equality is
achieved when y¯i−1 has a magnitude equal to infinity.
2Recall that we defined Ψµˆ to be the closed half-plane defined by the line joining yˆ and yA and contains the
point µˆ.
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Figure 8: Illustrating first of the two possible configurations: ζ ∈ Ψµˆ (the closed half-plane defined
by the line joining yˆ and yA and contains the point µˆ) in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
Figure 9: Illustrating the second of the two possible configurations: ζ /∈ Ψµˆ (the closed half-plane
defined by the line joining yˆ and yA and contains the point µˆ) in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
ii. ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯i−1)‖ ≥ ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − yˆ)‖ , (21)
which holds whenever ζ is not contained in the closure of the half plane defined by the line
joining yˆ and yA and which contains the point µˆ. This can be seen in Figure 9. Equality is
achieved when y¯i−1 has a magnitude equal to infinity.
Therefore, we conclude that
‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yˆ − y¯i−1)‖ ≥ min(‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − ζ)‖, ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − yˆ)‖) . (22)
Further, applying the triangle inequality to the set of points ζ, yˆ, and y¯i−1, we obtain
‖yˆ − y¯i−1‖ ≤ ‖y¯i−1 − ζ‖+ ‖yˆ − ζ‖ . (23)
Combining (19), (22) and (23), we obtain
‖y¯i − ζ‖ ≤ ‖yA − ζ‖(‖y¯i−1 − ζ‖+ ‖yˆ − ζ‖)
min(‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − ζ)‖, ‖Proj(yˆ − µˆ, yA − yˆ)‖) ,
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Figure 10: Numerically generated plot to study the region of convergence for Algorithm 1 in two
dimensions. In the planar case, the value of the mean µˆ = µ = (0, 0) (shown as a (magenta)
star), the attacker’s mean ζ = (0.3,−0.2)(shown as a (black) diamond) and the sensor’s value
yˆ = (0.8, 0), shown as a (black) square. For every value of yA = [yA(1), yA(2)] on a grid in the
neighborhood of µ, we run Algorithm 1 for a set of different initial values y¯0. If the algorithm
converges to an α∗ ∈ (0, 1) for every choice of y¯0, then the corresponding point yA is shown as a
(green) dot. Otherwise, it is shown as a (red) cross. The analytically derived sufficient condition
from Theorem 4.6 is shown as a solid (blue) contour. The analytically derived necessary condition
from Theorem 4.4 is shown as a dashed (black) contour.
which converges if condition (18) is satisfied.
We show the necessity of (17) through the following construction. Suppose that condition (17)
is violated. Equivalently, suppose that the angle between the vectors yA − ζ and yˆ − µˆ is in the
interval [0, pi/2) (we refer the reader to Figure 5 for an illustration). Now, we can choose a y¯0 to
be arbitrarily close to the red region (α = 1). The coefficient in front of ‖yA − ζ‖ in (19) can be
made arbitrarily large. Therefore, in one iteration of the algorithm, α1 = 1. This establishes the
necessity of (17). 
This result is numerically verified in Figure 10. In this figure, condition (17) is the vertical line
passing through the point ζ (the black diamond). We can see that there are no green points that
lie strictly to the right of this vertical line, thereby numerically verifying the necessity of (17).
Akin to the necessary condition, we seek a result which does not depend upon the knowledge
of ζ. Suppose that ζ ∈ C¯, where C¯ is a set known to the sensor. Define the set Sζ as the set of all
points which satisfy the sufficient conditions from Theorem 4.6. Then, the following result holds.
Corollary 4.7 (Sufficient Condition) A sufficient condition for strong convergence of Algo-
rithm 1 is that
yA ∈
⋂
ζ∈C¯
Sζ .
Proof: Suppose that yA ∈
⋂
ζ∈C¯ Sζ . From Theorem 4.6, this means that for every ζ¯ ∈ C¯ and for
every non-trivial initial condition y¯0, α
∗ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, Algorithm 1 strongly converges. 
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Figure 11: Plot of how the analytic necessary condition from Corollary 4.7 evolves for increasing
radii of the set C¯ which contains ζ. This plot has been numerically generated by sampling 100
points uniformly randomly out of circles C¯ of radii equal to zero (solid (red) line), 0.2 (dotted
(green) line), and 0.4 (dashed (blue) line). In this figure, we show yˆ as a (black) square and µ as a
(black) dot.
We now plot the analytic condition from Corollary 4.7 for different sets C¯. In particular, let
the value of the mean µˆ = µ = (0, 0) (since this is a planar case), the sensor’s value yˆ = (0.8, 0),
and the set C¯ be different circles of increasing radii around µ. Then, Figure 11 shows how the set⋂
ζ∈C¯ Sζ evolves with increasing radius of C¯. As is expected, the set computed for a smaller radius
contains the set computed for one with higher radius. Since the sufficient condition is of interest to
the attacker, we can see that with higher uncertainty in the mismatch between the means, the set
of values of yA that guarantee convergence of Algorithm 1 shrinks in size, making it increasingly
difficult for an attacker to always guarantee convergence of Algorithm 1.
5 A Special Case: Equal Means
This section addresses the case when the random variables y|yˆ and yˆ have equal means, i.e., µ = ζ.
This scenario may arise in the following situation: the entire multi-sample d is viewed as multiple
independent measurements of a random vector and the trusted sample dˆ drawn by the sensor is
not sent to the central computer for computation. This will mean that the random variables yˆ
and y are independent with possibly equal expected values (depending on the algorithm g(.) and
the sampling distribution for the measurements). However, since y is computed using many more
samples than yˆ, y is likely to have a lower variance if computed in a non-adversarial setting.
Through a simple substitution of the mismatch parameter δ = 0, it follows that the results from
Section 3 apply directly to this case of equal means. However, the conditions from Theorem 3.1 as
well as the computation of equilibria still requires complete information of the problem parameters,
i.e., yˆ, µ and yA. So we can study the convergence conditions for Algorithm 1 in this limiting
regime, which we now formally present.
Corollary 5.1 (Necessary Conditions with ζ = µ) Suppose that ζ = µ.
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i. For Algorithm 1 to converge to α∗ = 0, y¯∗ = yA and yA must satisfy
(yA − µ)T (yˆ − yA) ≥ 0 .
ii. For Algorithm 1 to weakly converge, yA must satisfy
(yˆ − µ)T (yA − yˆ) < 0 .
iii. For Algorithm 1 to yield a converging sequence of mixed α∗ ∈ (0, 1), yA must satisfy
‖yA − µ‖ ≤ ‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yˆ − yA)‖ .
Proof: When ζ = µ, Assumption 4.1 is trivially satisfied. Also, we have that µˆ = µ. Additionally,
the requirement in the third case of Theorem 4.4 is also trivially satisfied. Therefore, applying
Theorem 4.4, we obtain the claim. 
This result provides an improvement over the conditions presented in our previous work [4]. We
numerically verify this claim by studying the region of divergence for Algorithm 1 in two dimensions.
In this simulation, the value of the mean µ = (0, 0), and the sensor’s value yˆ = (1, 0). For every
value of yA on a grid in the neighborhood of µ, we ran Algorithm 1 for a set of different initial values
y¯0. The results are summarized in Figure 12. If the algorithm converged to an α
∗ 6= 1 for some
choice of y¯0, then the corresponding point yA is colored green. Otherwise, it is colored red. The
analytically derived necessary conditions from Corollary 5.1 are shown as a black dashed contour.
We can see that the result is fairly tight especially in the regions where yA makes an angle that is
either very close to zero or to pi. We should expect this to be the case since one can show that the
results are exact in the scalar case [4].
Next, we address the sufficient condition for strong convergence of Algorithm 1 in this case of
equal means.
Corollary 5.2 (Sufficient Conditions with ζ = µ) Suppose that ζ = µ. Algorithm 1 will con-
verge in the strong sense if the following two conditions are satisfied.
i. (yA − µ)T (yˆ − µ) ≤ 0 , (24)
ii. ‖yA − µ‖ ≤ ‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yA − µ)‖ . (25)
Additionally, as long as the points µ, yA and yˆ are non-collinear, condition (24) is also necessary
for strong convergence.
Proof: Since ζ = µ, condition (17) reduces to (24), while (18) reduces to
‖yA − µ‖ ≤ min(‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yA − µ)‖, ‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yA − yˆ)‖) (26)
We now refer the reader to Figure 13 for an illustration of this scenario in which the angle γ between
the vectors yA−µ and yˆ−µ is in the interval [pi/2, pi] (i.e., condition (24) holds). From the exterior
angle property applied to triangle formed by yˆ, µ and yA, we conclude that pi − γ > θ, where θ is
the angle between the vectors µ− yˆ and yA − yˆ. Therefore,
‖yˆ − µ‖ cos(pi − γ) ≤ ‖yˆ − µ‖ cos θ ⇔ ‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yA − µ)‖ ≤ ‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yA − yˆ)‖ .
Therefore, (26) reduces to (25). Applying Theorem 4.6, we obtain the desired claim. The necessity
of (24) follows using the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 4.6. 
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Figure 12: Numerically generated plot to study the region of divergence for Algorithm 1 in two
dimensions. The value of the mean µ = (0, 0) (shown as a (magenta) star), and the sensor’s value
yˆ = (1, 0), shown as a (black) square. For every value of yA = [yA(1), yA(2)] on a grid in the
neighborhood of µ, we run Algorithm 1 for a set of different initial values y¯0. If the algorithm
converges to an α∗ 6= 1 for some choice of y¯0, then the corresponding point yA is shown as a (green)
dot. Otherwise, it is shown as a (red) cross. The analytically derived necessary conditions from
Theorem 5.1 are shown as a dashed (black) contour.
Figure 13: Illustration of a geometric property arising in the proof of Corollary 5.2. In this special
case, ‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yA − µ)‖ ≤ ‖Proj(yˆ − µ, yA − yˆ)‖.
Remark 5.3 In case the points µ, yA and yˆ become collinear, the problem reduces to the scalar
case described in [4].
This result is numerically verified in Figure 14. We can see that the theoretical conditions have
a fairly low gap, especially in the scalar case, i.e., for choices of yA that lie on the x-axis, in which
case the result is known to be tight [4].
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Figure 14: Numerically generated plot to study the region of convergence for Algorithm 1 in two
dimensions. The value of the mean µ = (0, 0) (shown as a (magenta) star), and the sensor’s
value yˆ = (1, 0), shown as a (black) square. For every value of yA = [yA(1), yA(2)] on a grid in
the neighborhood of µ, we run Algorithm 1 for a set of different initial values y¯0. If the algorithm
converges to an α∗ 6= 1 for every choice of y¯0, then the corresponding point yA is shown as a (green)
dot. Otherwise, it is shown with a (red) cross. The analytically derived sufficient conditions from
Corollary 5.2 is shown as a solid (blue) contour. The analytically derived necessary conditions from
Corollary 5.1 are shown as a dashed (black) contour.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
This work introduced a novel approach to trusted computation when a central node is leveraged
to carry out a complex computation, but is likely to be compromised by an adversary. In our
approach, we considered a sensor that may perform approximate but trusted computation on
partial data, which is then fused with the output of the central computer in an optimal manner.
We proposed a game-theoretic formulation and formalized an iterated best response algorithm.
Formal statements were derived that characterize parameter regimes under which the iterative
algorithm converges. The derived necessary and sufficient conditions become relatively tight in the
case when the distributions of the unknown random variables used by the defender and the attacker
to compute their respective cost functions have identical means. Numerical simulations validate
our theoretical results.
This work spawns several future directions in this general theme of trusted computation. One
promising direction is to apply these concepts to a specific computation, such as maximum eigen-
value, to explore tradeoffs between the size of the subset of the original data that needs to be
retained by the sensor and the sizes of the regions of convergence. Further, this paper posed
trusted computation as a static problem. It would be of interest to explore dynamic variants of this
problem. For example, in this paper, the parameter yA is simply chosen by the attacker and is kept
fixed in the duration of the game. What if yA were to also depend upon the defender’s strategy α?
It would also be of interest to explore more specific models of attacks in which the attacker can
only attack at the computational level or at the data level. Another interesting research direction
would be to formulate scenarios in which the data owner may also use similar iterative schemes as
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a honeypot [6] to decide whether a particular third-party computation service is trustworthy.
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